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Abstract: 
 
 A monetary policy framework based on targeting a relative inflation-forecast is proposed for the 
economies converging to the euro. Such strategy aims at containing the differentials between the 
domestic and the implicit monetary union inflation forecasts. Hence these differentials become a 
basis for setting an operational policy target.  The proposed framework can be viewed as an 
extension of flexible inflation targeting that prioritizes low and stable inflation over the exchange 
rate stability. It is believed to be consistent with the Maastricht convergence criteria and can be 
implemented in concurrence with the exchange rate stability benchmark for the ERM2. Several 
empirical tests are conducted to determine feasibility of adopting an instrument rule for the 
proposed policy framework in the three largest inflation-targeting candidates to the euro: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The stability tests as well as the volatility dynamics tests 
suggest that adoption of the relative inflation-forecast targeting framework is possible in these 
countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Monetary policy-makers in the new Member States (NMS) that joined the European Union (EU) 
in 2004 and 2007 are facing a challenging task of devising an appropriate policy framework for 
navigating the path of convergence to the eurozone. The larger NMS countries are now pursuing 
autonomous monetary policies based on direct inflation-targeting (DIT)1 that will, however,  
have to be modified at the more advanced stage of convergence.  These modifications are likely 
to be based on easing the exclusive targeting of domestic inflation and incorporating the 
objectives of lowering the spreads between domestic and the eurozone monetary variables for 
effective implementation of convergence to the euro.  
The literature pertaining to modern inflation-targeting regimes does not offer much 
guidance in this respect as it focuses primarily on domestic monetary variables in the context of 
fully autonomous policy regimes and generally does not take into consideration the issue of 
monetary convergence to a currency union (Bernanke et al., 1999; Svensson, 1999; Levin et al., 
2004; Faust and Henderson, 2004).  A number of empirical studies addressing the eurozone 
enlargement tackle various aspects of monetary strategies; however, they generally do not aim at 
prescribing optimal monetary policy sequencing for transition from the current autonomous 
policies to the euro via the obligatory interim ERM2 stage (Begg, et al., 2003; Kočenda, et al., 
2006; DeGrauwe and Schnabl, 2005).   In an attempt to tackle this issue, this paper proposes a 
modified DIT framework for convergence to the euro.  
The proposed monetary policy framework is an extension of current DIT regimes that 
takes into account the dominant (flexible) inflation target and the exchange rate stability 
objective.  It is based on relative inflation-forecast targeting (RIFT). Its key precept is that a 
dynamic reduction of differentials between the domestic and the implicit monetary union 
inflation forecast for a predetermined time-period becomes the main operational goal of 
monetary policy. In the long run, the inflation target of the converging country becomes fully 
aligned with the common currency area inflation forecast.   For the euro-candidates, the eurozone 
inflation forecast can be formulated on the basis of the Maastricht convergence inflation 
benchmark that requires the inflation rate of the euro-candidate not to exceed the average 
inflation of the three lowest EU inflation rates by more than 1.5 percent.  Therefore, the proposed 
                                                 
1
 By direct inflation targeting we understand a policy regime that is geared toward achieving a prescribed numerical 
inflation goal, as oppose to indirect inflation targeting that aims at achieving long-term price stability via alternative   
targets, such as  a stable exchange rate or money growth. 
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RIFT framework is believed to be consistent with the Maastricht convergence criteria assuming 
that the officially chosen ERM2 central parity rate does not violate the inflation benchmark. 
Implementation of RIFT is based on the policy “instrument dichotomy”, i.e. on changes 
in the central bank reference interest rate as well as foreign exchange market interventions. 
Shocks to inflation forecasts, particularly those perceived as permanent, are countered with 
increases in interest rates, while shocks to exchange rate stability may be offset with foreign 
exchange market intervention.  A possible currency depreciation shock can be also counteracted 
with higher interest rates but only if it poses a serious threat to the realization of the inflation 
target.  The instrument dichotomy is unavoidable for alleviating potential conflicts between 
disinflation and exchange rate stability objectives.   
The empirical section of this study is designed to investigate the link between the NMS 
vis-à-vis eurozone inflation differentials (viewed as the policy target variable), the exchange rate 
(as a supporting convergence objective) and the candidates’ short-term interest rates (as the 
policy instrument). If these variables are interdependent, implementation of RIFT will not 
jeopardize financial stability in these countries.   Moreover, policies aimed at prioritizing 
disinflation are not likely to exacerbate exchange rate volatility beyond the fluctuations band 
prescribed by the ERM2, providing that the reference exchange rate is set around the long-term 
market equilibrium rate and the fluctuations band remains to be wide (at 15 percent around the 
central parity). Feasible adoption of RIFT depends on a prior record of price stability and on a 
functional relationship between the time-varying dynamics of the relative inflation-forecast, the 
nominal exchange rate and market interest rates. Such stability enables policy-makers to devise a 
credible instrument rule for RIFT.  
Section 2 of this paper explains the rationale for targeting the differential (spread) 
between the domestic and the eurozone inflation forecasts. The model outlining the RIFT 
framework is presented in Section 3. Section 4 examines the degree of stability of interactions 
between inflation differentials vis-à-vis the eurozone, exchange rates and short-term interest rates 
in the three largest inflation-targeting NMS, namely, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. 2 
The stability testing of the derived instrument rule for RIFT is conducted in Section 5 by 
                                                 
2
 In addition to the three examined NMS, The National Bank of Slovakia has also adopted DIT. The new policy was 
announced in May 2004 following the country’s EU accession, as part of strategy to adopt the euro in 2009. Since it 
went into effect as of January 2005, the Slovak experience with DIT is too recent and does not provide a sufficient 
number of observations for inclusion in the empirical section of this paper.  
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employing the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with variance-in-mean 
and generalized error distribution (GARCH-M-GED) process. The concluding Section 6 
summarizes key findings and presents several policy recommendations. 
 
2. Functional Identity between Long-Term Inflation Targets 
 
Monetary policies in the NMS converging to the euro have undergone a remarkable transition 
since the inception of economic reforms in the early 1990s.  At the early stage of reforms, central 
banks were confronted with the task of containing extremely high inflation stemming mainly 
from the far-reaching price liberalization.  Lacking prior record of policy credibility and facing 
underdeveloped, highly volatile financial markets, central banks in these countries could not 
achieve financial stability by employing flexible, autonomous monetary policies.  Thus they 
resorted to currency pegs.  
 As the transition evolved, currency pegs became increasingly burdensome. Fixed 
exchange rates combined with the remnants of high inflation eventually led to real currency 
appreciation and, subsequently, to current account deficits and deteriorating risk structure of 
capital inflows. These unfavorable developments prompted the monetary authorities to devising 
various exit strategies from currency pegs toward autonomous monetary policies and 
increasingly flexible exchange rates (Corker et al., 2000).  After rather unsuccessful experiments 
with interest rate targeting, followed by monetary base targeting (only in Poland) and targeting 
the exchange rate within the crawling devaluation band several central banks have ultimately 
embraced DIT strategies (Masson, 1999; Orlowski, 2004; Jonas and Mishkin, 2005; Roger and 
Stone, 2005).  The Czech National Bank (CNB) began implementing DIT in January 1998, the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP) in January 1999 and the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) in 
May 2001.3  The actual implementation of DIT stirred a heated debate over its timing, the exact 
format and the overall rationale.  In the case of Poland, the new policy was initially characterized 
as a bit premature since the country’s average monthly annualized CPI headline inflation in 1998 
was still running at 11.9 percent and the functional relationships between inflation and other 
monetary policy variables were highly unstable (Christofferssen and Wescott, 1999).  Without 
doubt, the three examined NMS did not satisfy the prerequisites for DIT formulated by Mishkin 
                                                 
3
 A more detailed examination of the systemic evolution of DIT regimes in these countries can be found for instance 
in Roger and Stone (2005) or Orlowski (2005).  
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(2000); particularly the requirement of single-digit inflation, a stable relationship between 
inflation and policy instruments, and the well-defined channels of monetary policy transmission.  
Nevertheless, strong commitment to disinflation and confidence about gaining monetary stability 
in the near future prompted policy-makers in these countries to embrace DIT (Jonas and 
Mishkin, 2005). 
At the early stage of DIT, the three central banks had to streamline policy efforts toward 
achieving the predetermined inflation target without consideration alternative policy objectives, 
such as income growth or currency stability.  By the time of the EU accession in May 2004, the 
DIT policies significantly contributed to price stability in the three NMS (Roger and Stone, 
2005).  Inflation became stabilized at low levels and interest rate risk premia for investors fell 
significantly.  Thus in essence, the early DIT strategies laid out favorable ground for advancing 
to the next stage of monetary reforms in these countries, namely the convergence to the euro.  As 
stipulated by the Maastricht convergence criteria, in addition to reducing inflation, the 
converging NMS have to stabilize the exchange rate and reduce long-term interest rates in order 
to become eligible for adopting the euro. In practical terms, the multiple tasks of monetary 
convergence imply a necessity of relaxing the rigid DIT regimes by combining low inflation and 
exchange rate stability objectives.4  
The RIFT framework proposed in this study incorporates the convergence parameters 
into a more flexible variant of DIT that combines the inflation with the exchange rate stability 
objectives.5 It prioritizes targeting the relative inflation-forecast, i.e. the differential between the 
domestic and the monetary union inflation forecasts. Such approach allows for a better 
synchronization of the policy target and instrument variables in the converging countries with the 
corresponding variables in the currency union. The analytical assumptions for RIFT can be stated 
as follows: 
                                                 
4
 Serious concerns about inflexibility of the Maastricht criteria are expressed by Kenen and Meade (2003), who 
question the rationale of using the average inflation and long-term interest rates in the three lowest inflation EU 
countries as monetary convergence benchmarks and instead suggest applying the inflation rates and the average 
long-term interest rates prevailing in the euro area.   
5
 The proposed framework is suitable for the countries that are currently pursuing DIT strategies and whose financial 
markets are relatively well-developed, thus capable of providing appropriate policy signals. Such framework may 
not be a ‘best-practice’ policy option for smaller NMS, such as the Baltic States that pursue a currency board 
arrangement on their passage toward the euro. Their departure from the present monetary regime could entail large 
shocks to their undercapitalized and volatile financial markets.  
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1. The monetary policy reaction function of a converging country is based on the 
differential between the domestic and the implicit monetary union inflation forecast.6 
This differential becomes the policy operational target (as distinguished from the long-
term target) and is subject to continuous monitoring and revisions as its time-varying path 
is conditional on the nominal exchange rate volatility.  
2. In the long-run, the inflation targets of the converging countries and the monetary union 
become identical. The candidates relinquish a certain degree of policy autonomy and act 
as the long-term inflation ‘target-takers’. Such target identity is likely to mitigate the risk 
of experiencing major nominal shocks to convergence.  
3. The inflation-forecast differential takes priority over the exchange rate stability.  Such 
hierarchy of goals means adherence to the ‘instrument dichotomy’ rule whereas interest 
rates are adjusted in response to changes in the relative inflation-forecast, while exchange 
rate stability is secured with foreign exchange rate market interventions.  Thus in essence, 
the RIFT framework combines inflation targeting with a managed float.   
4. Policy-makers adjust the inflation-forecast differential in response to changes in a matrix 
of selected indicator variables that may include changes in money growth rates, market 
interest rates and term spreads on sovereign bonds - all in relation to their corresponding 
monetary union levels.  
 
The underlying conjecture of RIFT is that a continuation of DIT strategies in the present 
form would likely yield suboptimal results relative to the main tasks of a smooth convergence to 
the euro. Stating briefly, it would exacerbate volatility of monetary variables, particularly 
nominal and real exchange rates, thus elevate risk premia and deteriorate the risk structure of 
capital inflows.  
Consistently with the above assumptions, central banks in small converging economies 
cannot set policy targets and adjust instruments exclusively on the basis of domestic 
macroeconomic fundamentals; they need to monitor and forecast the corresponding foreign 
variables as well.  Narrower differentials between domestic and foreign variables signalize the 
progress of convergence. A set of indicator variables relevant for monitoring convergence may 
include compression of long-term bond yields, declining market risk premia, relative money 
                                                 
6
 In practical terms, the implicit currency union inflation forecast can be proxied by the Maastricht inflation 
benchmark.  Its reference value in May 2007 was set at 3.0 percent (ECB, 2007).   
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growth rates (as one of the determinants of the inflation risk) and the exchange rate volatility (the 
exchange rate risk).   Effective reduction of these risks contributes to better synchronization 
between domestic and eurozone inflation expectations.   
The long-run equivalence of inflation targets between the converging country and the 
currency union can be stated as 
 
0*
,,
=− ++ tttt κκ pipi                   (1) 
 
where tt ,κpi +  denotes the domestic long-term inflation target and 
*
,tt κpi +  denotes the implicit 
foreign  target, both specified at time t  for κ -periods ahead7.  
In an alternative form, the target identity can be prescribed as 
 
*
,, tttt κκ piγpi ++ =                                                    (2) 
 
The γ  translator between foreign and domestic inflation targets is equal one if there is a perfect 
identity between these targets.  It may slightly exceed unity for a converging economy, thus 
assimilate a small “inflation target premium” intended to provide a safety cushion against 
possible external shocks for κ -periods ahead. Yet, such a cushion does not necessarily constitute 
the best-practice policy, because it entails an inflation risk premium that might be associated 
with a persistent fiscal dominance, political instability or other potential threats to financial 
stability.  On one hand, a perfect target identity without a safety cushion underscores policy-
makers’ full commitment to monetary convergence, while on the other, a cushion built into the 
domestic inflation target is likely to raise public doubts about effectiveness of the official 
convergence program.  
 In a backward-looking open-economy setting, a central bank reaction function within a 
strict DIT operational framework can be stated as 
 
11, +++ ∆+∆+=+∆ tstitttt si ββpiθpi τ                                       (3) 
                                                 
7
 With respect to NMS, the κ -period should correspond with the timing of their assessment of eligibility for 
adopting the euro.  The implicit target for κ -periods ahead may be modified upon the entry to ERM2 that requires a 
two-year test period for the exchange rate stability. 
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The first-order autoregressive movements of inflation, short-term interest rate and exchange rate 
are respectively: 1−−=∆ ttt pipipi , ttt iii −=∆ ++ 11  and ttt sss −=∆ ++ 11 . 
Eq. (3) reflects the first-order autoregressive inflation process as a function of two 
endogenous variables, namely the long-term inflation target and the inflation risk premium tθ , as 
well as the next period’s interest rate and nominal exchange rate as exogenous variables. The 
historical inflation risk premium can be assessed as a difference between a smoothed inflation 
rate extrapolated from the past and the neutral nominal interest rate. Computed in this way, the 
inflation risk premium is in essence identical with the observed dynamic neutral real interest rate. 
In a forward-looking setting, the inflation risk premium can be also endogenized as it is likely to 
decline along with the expected gains in monetary policy credibility.  
It can be further noted that the forward-looking domestic inflation target shall account for 
a long-term inflation risk free target rf tt ,τpi +  and the prevalent inflation risk premium, such as 
 
ttt
rf
tt θpipi ττ −= ++ ,,                   (4) 
 
 The functional relationship prescribed by Eq. (3) implies that an observed surge in 
inflation might be counteracted by raising the next period’s interest rate (as the adjustment in the 
policy instrument), or translated into the next period’s domestic currency depreciation (increased 
ts ) if there is no change in the policy instrument.  Thus by assumption 1=+ si ββ .  If iβ  equals 
zero, the policy stance is neutral, allowing the national currency to depreciate.   
A more dynamic version of policy reaction function prescribed by Eq. (3) takes into 
consideration exchange rate pass-through effects on inflation.  A complete pass-through takes 
place when 
 
ltts s +− ∆=∆ piβ 1                 (5a) 
 
with the optimal pass-through period denoted by 1+l . A partial pass-through is reflected by 
 
ltts s +− ∆=∆ piββ λ1                                                          (5b) 
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The pass-through effects can become neutralized by actual or expected interest rate increases; 
then, sβ  is equal zero. 
 As the DIT strategy evolves to a more advanced stage, it becomes increasingly important 
for a central bank to contain inflation by influencing the public’s expectations.  This can be 
accomplished by improved information disclosure and, in general terms, by a higher degree of 
central bank transparency, which constitutes a critical component of a DIT strategy (Bernanke et 
al, 1999).  In a more transparent policy environment, actual inflation follows a path of prior 
inflation expectations, which in essence entails ’activation’ of the expectations channel of 
monetary policy transmission.  In order to increase sensitivity of actual inflation to inflation 
expectations, a central bank may choose to adopt a forward-looking policy approach with interest 
rate decisions based on the difference between the inflation forecast and the official target.  
Under such policy scenario, a reaction function of the central bank in an open economy setting 
can be specified as 
 
11,, ++++ ∆+∆+−=∆ tstittttt si ββθpipi ττ                (6) 
 
The inflation forecast for the τ -period ahead, which corresponds with the inflation target period, 
is reflected by tt ,τpi +∆ . 
 The reaction function prescribed by Eq. (6) reflects an open-economy environment since 
it includes the exchange rate variable.  Such functional relationshp provides a basis for a flexible 
inflation targeting rule because it entails combination of low inflation and exchange rate stability 
objectives.8  The reaction function prescribed by Eq. (6) focuses on the deviation between the 
path of domestic inflation and the inflation target and does not account for the corresponding 
foreign inflation variables. 
 
3. RIFT Model 
 
                                                 
8
 Flexible inflation targeting models that incorporate the exchange rate stability objective have been introduced to 
the literature by Ball (1999), expanded, among others, by Svensson (2000), and adopted to the environment of 
transition economies by Orlowski (2001; 2005) and Golinelli and Rovelli (2005). They do not, however, incorporate 
the fundamental objectives faced by the economies converging to a common currency area.  
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By introducing the foreign inflation target and forecast variables, the central bank reaction 
function in the converging country becomes 
 
11
*
,,
*
,, ++++++ ∆+∆+−−=∆−∆ tstittttttttt si ββpiθpipipi ττττ                         (7) 
 
with the asterisk denoting foreign variables.  
 
Since inflation risk is embedded in a broader market risk, we incorporate into the above 
functional relationship the market risk premium tψ , which is assumed to account for the 
difference between domestic inflation-risk-free target and the foreign inflation target point (or 
forecast if the explicit foreign target is not specified). The market risk premium is specified as 
 
*
,, tttttt ττ piθpiψ ++ −−=                                                                        (8)
                
 Augmented with the market risk parameter, the RIFT operational framework becomes 
 
11
*
,, ++++ ∆+∆+=∆−∆ tstittttt si ββψpipi ττ                         (9) 
It shall be noted that the identity between the long-term inflation targets can be only ensured 
when the market risk premium tψ  cedes to exist.  Since the domestic market risk premium is 
ultimately encapsulated by an average excess variability of domestic inflation over the variability 
of implicit foreign inflation in the observed recent period kt − , it can be proxied by the 
difference between the conditional variances of domestic and implicit foreign inflation rates 
denoted respectively by 2tσ  and 
2*
tσ .  
 
∫ ∫
− −
=−
t
kt
t
kt
ttt dd ψκσκσ 2*2                (10) 
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As stated above, a successful monetary convergence requires the market risk premium to be 
gradually reduced to zero, thus 
 
0lim →tψ                  (11) 
 
Reduction of the market risk premium can be viewed as an important condition for effective 
convergence because large risk premia tend to precipitate shocks to nominal exchange rates 
(Orlowski, 2003; Csermely, 2004; Dibooglu and Kutan, 2005) as well as real exchange rates 
(Golinelli and Rovelli, 2005; Kočenda, et al., 2006).    
In sum, the RIFT reaction function prescribed by Eq. (9) implies that the central bank of a 
converging country can either raise short-term interest rates or let the national currency 
depreciate in response to a surge in the relative inflation-forecast. It further assumes that in the 
long-run market risk premium will gradually converge to zero. Because of the continued priority 
of the inflation target over the alternative policy objectives, the RIFT framework shall be viewed 
as an extension of and not a replacement for DIT.9    
From the stanpoint of effective convergence, it may be pragmatic to formulate the 
operating target reflecting the inflation differential as a gradually narrowing range.  A range 
rather than a point specification of the target may allow the candidate’s inflation forecast to 
overshoot the implicit monetary union forecast by a certain narrow margin, which will not 
jeopardize achieving price stability in the long run.  This means that the monetary policy 
operating target on the path toward the euro could be formulated as a one-sided asymmetric 
range, with the lower boundary fixed at a perfect parity between the domestic and the implicit 
currency union inflation forecast, and the upper boundary set at a predetermined margin above it. 
A reasonably narrow range is likely to provide a safety cushion against possible temporary 
inflation shocks stemming from large capital inflows that will be likely accelerated by the 
convergence expectations.   
                                                 
9
 It can be also noted that the reaction function prescribed by Eq. (9) differs from standard central bank loss 
functions that emphasize a trade-off between disinflation and narrowing the output gap.  Income creation can still be 
accounted for within the RIFT framework in a more dynamic, intertemporal setting. It is because the proposed 
policy is ultimately designed to mitigate the market risk premium, which in turn is likely to promote credit growth 
thus generate more favorable consumer spending and business investment conditions. 
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Because the RIFT reaction function prescribed by Eq. (9) implies adoption of an 
extended, more flexible variant of DIT, its practical implementation should be based on observed 
changes in selected indicator variables. Since a detailed, comprehensive examination of all 
necessary indicator and instrument variables for the RIFT exceeds the scope of this study, our 
empirical analysis focuses only on evaluation of the instrument rule.  The analyzed rule reflects 
the time-varying path of short-term interest rates as a function of changes in the selected target 
and indicator variables, which include the differential between domestic vis-à-vis eurozone 
inflation, the nominal exchange rate and the foreign short-term interest rate.  Inclusion of the 
foreign interest rate highlights the fact that the converging country’s central bank acts as a 
‘policy-taker’ since its intrument decisions follow closely the underlying market conditions and 
central bank decisions in the common currency system. In addition, the policy rule may include 
some priority weighting on narrowing the output gap. As a consequence, the basic RIFT 
instrument rule is derived from Eq. (9) and augmented with changes in the foreign interest rate 
*
ti as well as the output gap tyˆ  
 
( ) tttifttsyttttytt isyi εββpipiββψββ ττττpiψ +++−+++= ++++ * ,,* ,,0 ˆ                      (11) 
 
All variables in Eq. (11) are in first differences and τ  is a forward-looking lag operator 
that may vary for each of the independent variables.  In essence, Eq. (11) represents a complex 
Taylor rule that reflects various policy preferences under conditions of a converging open 
economy.  On practical grounds, such policy rule may be difficult to implement since it contains 
a number of seemingly conflicting target and instrument variables. Moreover, it may prove to be 
impractical if policy-makers will not have a full knowledge about monetary policy transmission 
channels, as argued by Svensson (2003). This word of caution certainly pertains to NMS for 
which it remains debatable whether a suficient degree of stability of the exchange rate, the 
aggregate demand, the credit, and the expectations channels has been reached (Golinelli and 
Rovelli, 2005; Dibooglu and Kutan, 2005; Kočenda, et al., 2006). Moreover, such a complex 
instrument rule may not be transparent and credible.  For this reason, a number of simplifications 
can be made on a passage toward a common currency considering the priority of the inflation 
target and monetary convergence tasks over the output gap stability.  Consistently, the weight on 
the output gap can be reduced to zero.  Exclusion of the output gap will also help alleviate the 
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potential problem of serial correlation between the exchange rate and market risk dynamics, and 
the output gap. With the yβ  parameter equal zero, the RIFT forward-looking policy rule 
becomes 
 
( ) '*
,,
*
,,0 tttifttsyttttt isi εββpipiβψββ ττττpiψ +++−++= ++++                       (12) 
 
In sum, the policy rule prescribed by Eq. (12) is based on changes in short-term market 
interest rates as a function of the relative inflation-forecast for the τ -period ahead, the exchange 
rate and the foreign interest rate forecasts, the neutral (Wicksellian) interest rate (denoted by 0β ) 
and the market risk premium dynamics10.  Phrasing differently, the implementation of the RIFT 
policy rule is guided by the objective of narrowing the forward-looking inflation differential with 
some consideration given to stabilizing the exchange rate. It can, however, be hindered by 
potentially volatile foreign interest rates that could obstruct the process of monetary 
convergence.  It can be further thwarted by an excessive market risk premium, a serious 
component of which is the inflation risk. In the case of NMS the inflation risk is believed to be 
associated with the Balassa-Samuelson effects.11 In essence, the implementation of RIFT 
depends on the prior knowledge of the policy transmission channels or, in other words, on stable 
relationships between the regressors included in the instrument rule prescribed by Eq. (12). 
 
4. Feasibility of Adopting RIFT in the Euro-Candidate Countries 
 
Evidence of a sufficient stability of the components of the RIFT instrument rule is a crucial 
prerequisite for its successful implementation.  Most critical among them is the stability of the 
inflation series. Descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 shed some light on the established time-
path and the degree of stability of CPI-based inflation in the three examined NMS in comparison 
with the HICP-based inflation in the eurozone. The monthly data series begin respectively with 
the dates of DIT adoption by NMS and the eurozone inception, and end in June 2007.   
                                                 
10
 The time-varying market risk premium can be technically assessed through the GARCH-M process, which 
includes the conditional variance as the risk proxy in the conditional mean equation. Its detailed description and 
analysis can be found for instance in Poon and Granger (2003).  
11
 However, several recent empirical studies provide compelling evidence that the Balassa-Samuelson effects have 
dissipated and no longer contribute to the inflation process in NMS (Égert, et al. 2003; Błaszkiewicz et al. 2004), 
while others uphold their prevalence (Natalucci and Ravenna, 2002; DeGrauwe and Schnabl 2005).  
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….. insert Table 1 around here ….. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the average inflation in the three NMS has been higher and 
somewhat more unstable than the eurozone inflation, although in all three countries DIT policies 
have contributed to its declining time trend. Disinflation trends in the Czech Republic and 
Poland are more pronounced than the disinflation path in Hungary where fiscal dominance still 
persists and elevates inflation expectations (Kočenda, et al., 2006).  Perhaps more important 
from the standpoint of feasibility of RIFT are the measures of skewness and kurtosis. The 
obtained skewness indicators show that positive shocks to inflation in NMS prevail over the 
negative ones implying that at turbulent times the inflation risk remains to be quite substantial.  
In addition, inflation series in Poland and Hungary follow a platykurtic (wider-waist) distribution 
since the kurtosis coefficients for both countries are less than three. Thus evidently, inflation 
rates in these two countries tend to be more dispersed and unstable than those in the Czech 
Republic or in the eurozone at ‘normal’ or tranquil inflation volatility periods.  Furthermore, the 
inflation series in all three NMS are non-stationary (as implied by the ADF statistics), while the 
eurozone inflation follows a stationary path. 
In sum, the data shown in Table 1 suggest that DIT policies in NMS have contributed to 
the declining path of inflation.  However, headline inflation in these countries remains to be 
more unstable than the underlying inflation in the eurozone as indicates by the standard deviation 
coefficients. The excessive volatiity of inflation denotes elevated inflation. Thus a progress in 
mitigating inflation risk should be required of NMS for a more effective nominal convergence to 
the euro. 
In addition to the advancement of price stability, well-defined relationships between the 
key policy variables are needed for a feasible introduction of a forward-looking policy based on 
RIFT.  In particular, policy-makers need to be informed about optimal adjustment lags between 
interest rates and inflation, with a reasonable margin of error, if they are to devise appropriate 
interest rate adjustments for the purpose of hitting the future inflation target.  A full knowledge 
about the transmission of exchange rates into inflation is also indispensable. If the actual 
response lags were subject to large, unpredictable errors and the relationship between inflation, 
interest rates and exchange rates were highly unstable, forward-looking policy decisions guided 
by RIFT could lead to unintended outcomes. Moreover, reliable methodologies to prepare such 
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forecasts as well as their disclosure to the public at large are also necessary.  Given these 
prerequisites are met, inflation expectations of the central bank and the private sector will 
become fully synchronized making the implementation of RIFT feasible.  
To establish whether such stability has been in place in NMS, we investigate impulse 
responses between changes in the inflation differentials, exchange rates and short-term interest 
rates. The results are shown in Figures: 1a for the Czech Republic, 1b for Poland and 1c for 
Hungary. It shall be noted that all tested variables are in first differences, with four lags in VAR 
and a maximum of ten lag intervals applied for generating impulse responses. The inflation 
differentials are computed as a difference between actual domestic inflation and the eurozone 
inflation, which is smoothed with the Hodrick-Prescott filter in order to exclude the effects of 
transitory shocks.  The exchange rates are specified as domestic currency values of the euro. The 
first row in each set of graphs shows the response of the inflation differential to: its own shock, 
the shock to the exchange rate, and the shock to the short-term interest rate (3-month Treasury 
bill).  The left columns show feedback responses to the shock to the inflation differential on: the 
inflation differential itself, the exchange rate and the interest rate.      
 
….. insert Figures 1a, 1b and 1c around here ….. 
 
As demonstrated by the set of graphs for the Czech Republic, there is a pronounced 
positive response of the inflation differential to the shock in the exchange rate with a 2 to 5 
month lag. Thus evidently, inflation in the Czech Republic rises above the eurozone inflation 
trend in response to the Czech Koruna (CZK) depreciation. The inflation differential also widens 
in response to the shock to the short-term interest rate with a 2 month lag, which seems to 
indicate the impact of the interest rate risk premium on inflation. While the reaction of the 
exchange rate to the shock to the inflation differential seems ignorable, there is a pronounced 4 
month lagged response of the interest rate to the inflation differential, suggesting an active and 
effective instrumentalization of a forward-looking DIT.  
The structure of impulse responses in the case of Poland follows a very similar pattern to 
the Czech case.  The inflation differential responds positively to shocks to the exchange rate and 
to the short-term interest rate, although the response lag to the Polish Zloty (PLN) depreciation 
seems to be a bit shorter comparing to the Czech case, while the response to the elevated interest 
rate risk premium is somewhat more extended over time.  More importantly from the standpoint 
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of this analysis, there is a pronounced response of interest rates to the shock in the relative 
inflation, which also underscores prevalence of a forward-looking DIT.  It can be further noticed 
that interest rates in Poland respond positively to the PLN depreciation, while the response in the 
Czech case is rather inconclusive. 
There is also a pronounced response of the inflation differential to the shock to interest 
rates in Hungary, suggesting transmission of inflation expectations into interest rates i.e. 
prevalence of an elevated risk premium. But unlike in the previous two countries, the inflation 
differential in Hungary responds inversely to shocks to the exchange rate implying an 
inflationary impact of the Hungarian Forint (HUF) appreciation and subsequent large capital 
inflows. This impulse reaction may also stem from the combination of the crawling devaluation 
regime and high interest rate targets during the first 6 years of the sample period. Moreover, the 
short-term interest rates in Hungary do not seem to respond to shocks to the inflation differential, 
which seems to question an effective pursuit of DIT.  Clearly, the main drivers of inflation in 
Hungary, including the continuous fiscal dominance and the elevated interest rate risk, would 
have to be contained prior to adoption of a more flexible DIT.  
In conclusion, the evident gains in the degree of stability of the examined policy variables 
as well as the knowledge about their mutual interactions and policy transmission channels 
suggest that adoption of the proposed RIFT framework is plausible, particularly in the Czech 
Republic and Poland.  Its effective management will depend on a more precise knowledge and 
predictability of the transmission channels. Further inquiry in this area is needed due to the 
prevalent instability and unpredictability of the monetary policy transmission channels in these 
economies as evidenced by Égert, et al. (2007).   
 
5. RIFT Instrument Function – Volatility Dynamics Analysis  
 
Deeper insights on the interactions and the degree of stability among the examined variables can 
be derived from the volatility dynamics analysis.  As argued above, feasibility of adopting a 
realistic instrument rule for RIFT depends on stable co-movements between market interest 
rates, (forward-looking) inflation differentials and exchange rates.  Recognizing the importance 
of such prerequisites, the empirical section of this study is aimed to examine whether there is a 
predictable time-varying path of changes in interest rates as a function of changes in inflation 
differentials vis-à-vis the monetary union and the exchange rate.  For this purpose the two-step 
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GARCH(p,q)-M-GED tests are employed for the three NMS.  In essence, this exercise is aimed 
at testing stability of the RIFT instrument rule derived from the underlying RIFT model.  The 
GARCH process entails the conditional mean and the conditional variance equations.12  The 
conditional mean equation is the instrument function prescribed by Eq. (12) with the time-
varying market risk premium tψ  proxied by the GARCH conditional variance, i.e. the variance-
in-mean M component. The inflation differential variable is entered as a change in the difference 
between domestic and the Hodrick-Prescott filtered annualized HICP inflation rates for the 
eurozone.  The exchange rate is a change in the log of the average monthly domestic value of the 
euro. In consistency with Eq. (12), the tested conditional mean equation also includes as an 
additional regressor the eurozone interest rate, proxied by the German 3-month T-bill rate.  
The conditional variance equation that examines the impact of volatility subcomponents 
is specified as  
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Such specification of volatility dynamics consists of the ARCH term in the order of ‘p’ 
represented by ∑
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ARCH term shows the impact of the error variance in the previous period (or periods) on the 
current period error variance.  It allows for evaluating the impact of ‘innovations’ from the 
previous periods (up to the q-order) on the conditional variance.  The GARCH term reflects the 
degree of persistency in volatility as it measures the impact of the forecast variance from the 
previous period on the current conditional variance. In addition, the conducted empirical tests 
assume non-Gaussian distribution of error terms, which seems to be a realistic conjecture for the 
three NMS since they all follow DIT policies.13  Specifically, all the conducted tests for the 
                                                 
12
 The GARCH-M-GED is a combination of the GARCH process and the ‘in-mean’ extension (GARCH-M), 
estimated with generalized error distribution (GED) residuals. A comprehensive overview of the ARCH-class 
models can be found in Poon and Granger (2003). A noteworthy synthesis is given by Engle (2004) in his Nobel 
Prize acceptance lecture.  The applications of GARCH models for evaluating time-varying inflation volatility 
dynamics as well as various categories of financial risk in the NMS can be found in Matoušek and Taci (2003); 
Orlowski (2003 and 2005); and Kočenda and Valachy (2006). 
13
  The inclusion of non-Gaussian distribution parameters is an important aspect of inflation-forecast targeting 
practices, as argued by Svensson (1999; 2003).  It is because policy transmission mechanisms are intrinsically non-
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purpose of this exercise have shown consistently that the GARCH process is unconditionally 
symmetric and leptokurtic, that is, peaked at the center, with tails fatter than those of the normal 
distribution, as implied by the generalized error distribution GED parameters lower than 2.0.  
The leptokurtic volatility clustering is typical for smaller countries whose financial markets are 
susceptible to large nominal shocks.   
The empirical tests are conducted for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for the 
sample period January 1995 – June 2007 and their results are shown in Table 2.  It shall be noted 
that different data generating process (DGP) assumptions have been applied on the basis of 
minimizing the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria.14  The results of these tests are 
sensitive to DGP assumptions in terms of different lag operators of the tested variables, and the 
orders of ARCH and GARCH terms. The evidence of sensitivity to DGP assumptions implies 
prevalence of systemic differences between the three countries that drive the time-varying 
volatility dynamics process prescribed by Eqs. (12) and (13).  By design, observations preceding 
January 1995 have been excluded from this exercise due to the prevalent rigidities of exchange 
rates (currency pegs) and interest rates in all three countries.  In addition, all the tested variables 
have been entered in their first-differenced terms as they are all non-stationary at their levels.  
The one-period forwarded inflation differentials vis-à-vis the eurozone are treated as a proxy for 
relative inflation-forecasts for the three NMS.  
 
….. insert Table 2 around here ….. 
 
The empirical results reveal both common and country-specific factors underlying the 
tested volatility dynamics in the three NMS.  As indicated by the obtained estimates of the 
conditional mean equation, the time-varying path of interest rates is significantly driven by the 
forwarded inflation differentials both in Hungary and in Poland, but not in the Czech Republic 
where the inflation risk premium might have dissipated by now.  In both Hungary and the Czech 
                                                                                                                                                             
linear and non-additive thus a certainty-equivalence that is associated with a linear transmission is no longer 
applicable.  For this reason, a forecast-targeting procedure should not be restricted to the mean forecast only, but 
should also contain a conditional probability distribution of the target and instrument variables.  
14
 Alternative forms of ARCH-class models have also been tested but are excluded from this analysis due to their 
statistical insignificancy for all three NMS (in particular the asymmetric effects captured by threshold and 
exponential GARCH).  The orders of ARCH and GARCH components, as well as different lag operators of the 
regressors have been chosen by maximizing the likelihood ratio, minimizing the Akaike and Schwartz information 
criteria, and  investigating probabilities associated with Q-statistics in correlograms of standardized residuals. 
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Republic, interest rate increases (or decreases) correspond with a concurrent domestic currency 
depreciation (or appreciation). This finding suggests active exchange rate management. This 
empirical result is not surprising considering that the CNB officially follows a managed float and 
the NBH has adopted an ERM2-shadowing regime (Roger and Stone, 2005; Jonas and Mishkin, 
2005).  A different reaction is detected for Poland, which has been following a pure float since 
April 2000. Its short-term interest rates react inversely to the one-period forwarded exchange 
rate, or in other words, the expected PLN appreciation seems to drive up current interest rates.  In 
all three cases changes in domestic interest rates react positively to expected changes in the 
German (eurozone) interest rates, which indicates ongoing compression of yields on sovereign 
bonds.  The conditional mean equation estimation also shows the negative, statisically significant 
GARCH conditional variance coefficient for the Czech Republic and (insignificant) Poland. In 
contrast, the GARCH coefficient for Hungary is positive. The negative signs imply the ongoing 
convergence of the market risk premium to the steady-state in the first two NMS. A similar 
progress in financial stability and monetary convergence in Hungary is unfortunately not 
apparent. 
The estimated coefficients in the conditional variance equations point to the systemic and 
institutional differences in volatility dynamics in the NMS.  The ARCH innovations or 
‘surprises’ to the interest rate volatility are not uniform.  Shocks to the conditional volatility are 
transmitted quickly into higher interest rates in the Czech Republic and Poland, while a similar 
reaction is delayed by one period in Hungary. In addition, the conditional interest rate volatility 
is highly persistent in the first two countries, as indicated by the GARCH coefficients closer to 
the unity.  The volatility series show lower persistency but higher susceptibility to shocks in 
Hungary.  Significant higher-order ARCH effects in Hungary and the Czech Republic suggests 
that the interest rate volatility dynamics are subject to diverse shocks of rather unspecified 
duration – the sources of which very likely lie outside the boundaries of the monetary policy 
influence.  Not surprisingly, GED parameters in all three cases are considerably lower than two, 
implying a leptokurtic data distribution.  Evidently, interest rate volatility tends to be exacerbated 
during turbulent market times, which suggests that financial markets in these countries still 
remain vulnerable to large, potentially destabilizing shocks. One could however reasonably 
expect that the forward-looking policy based on the proposed RIFT framework would likely 
provide a suitable venue for pre-emptive actions to counter anticipated shocks to interest rates. 
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 The accuracy indicators for the forecasts generated by GARCH-M-GED  are somewhat 
encouraging for adopting the estimated functional relationships as a monetary policy instrument 
rule.  The forecast is highly accurate for Poland, as implied by the low value of the Theil 
coefficient and the very high covariance proportion relative to the sum of the bias and the 
variance proportions.  In the cases of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the GARCH forecasts 
seem fairly accurate given the low values of the Theil coefficients. The forecasts, however, seem 
somewhat unstable as implied by the insufficiently low covariance proportions. 
Further insights on the degree of stability of these forecast functions are provided by the 
GARCH variance distributions shown in Figures 2a-c.    
 
….. insert Figures 2 a-c around here ….. 
 
The GARCH conditional variance series for the Czech Republic shows a significant 
shock to interest rates in the aftermath of the DIT adoption in 1998 (Fig. 2a).  This can be 
explained by the CNB sharply increasing its interest rate target in response to the increase in 
administratively-regulated prices enacted by the Czech Government concurrently with the 
inception of DIT. By this action, the CNB defended the realization of the inflation target (Roger 
and Stone, 2005). Since 1999, the GARCH volatility of the Czech interest rates has been 
remarkably low and stable. These favorable conditions have been additionally reinforced by the 
adoption of a permanent low inflation target as of 2006.  The low volatility of the GARCH series 
is encouraging for adopting a policy based on RIFT.  
The GARCH conditional variance dynamics for Poland (Fig. 2b) show somewhat 
different results.  Since the inception of DIT in January 1999, the interest rate pattern has been a 
subject to several shocks, all of which occurring during the early stage of the new policy regime 
between 1999 and 2003.  During the first four years, the Polish DIT was based on the 
determination of year-end targets that were actively defended by the NBP (Orlowski, 2005). 
Specifically, the central bank reference rate reached 19 percent in February 2001. It was 
subsequently cut in several steps to 6.75 percent at the end of 2002 (Roger and Stone, 2005). In 
spite of such monetary tightening, the 1999 and 2000 inflation targets were significantly 
overshooted.  The 2001 target was achieved as a result of the tight monetary policy, but the 2002 
and 2003 targets were considerably undershooted. Since the beginning of 2003, the NBP 
switched from the year-end to the continuous inflation targeting within a 2.5-4.5 percent linear 
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trajectory band.  In hindsight, the Polish experience with DIT implementation provides strong 
evidence in support of the permanent inflation target over the year-end target determination15. 
Among other advantages, the permanent linear-trajectory inflation targets allow policy-makers to 
reduce volatility of interest rates (lower interest rate risk) and, therefore, to engender higher 
degree of financial stability than the year-end targets, which frequently necessitate abrupt interest 
rate increases.  
The volatility pattern of Hungarian interest rates (Fig. 2c) shows their considerable 
instability in 2002 and 2003, which resulted from the elevated inflation risk premium in response 
to a sharp deterioration of fiscal discipline and significant wage increases, particularly in the 
public sector (Kiss, 2005). In the 2002 election year, the government budget deficit jumped to 
9.2 percent of GDP and was reduced only to 7 percent in the following year.  To defend the 
inflation targets, the NBH raised interest rates. Its base reference rate reached 12 percent in 
January 2004 and has been decreasing since then along with the decline in private sector 
inflation expectations.  The Hungarian case seems to highlight the notion that inflation targeting 
cannot be successful without a disciplined fiscal policy as well as a stable political situation (low 
political risk premium).    
In sum, the presented empirical analysis shows that devising a reliable instrument rule for 
RIFT is possible, as the examined time-varying volatility dynamics relationships in NMS have 
become quite stable, particularly since the adoption of permanent inflation targets. The results 
underscore the importance of incorporating in the instrument function all three tested 
independent variables in the conditional variance equation: (1) the forwarded inflation 
differential, (2) the exchange rate and (3) the forwarded eurozone interest rate.  They also call 
attention to the need to mitigate inflation and inerest rate risks.  In hindsight, the RIFT 
framework along with its policy rule encompasses a complex set of economic indicators that may 
provide mixed signals about policy preferences to financial markets. For this reason, the 
proposed policy needs to be understood by the public at large in terms of its viability for 
ensuring a successful convergence to the euro. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The advantages of permanent inflation targets are explained by King (1996). 
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6.  A Synthesis 
 
This study proposes an extension to the inflation targeting strategies currently pursued by NMS 
for the purpose of ensuring their successful monetary convergence to the euro.  The proposed 
RIFT policy is based on targeting the inflation-forecast differentials between the converging 
country and the monetary union. In such modified framework, the low inflation target takes 
priority over the exchange rate stability objective. Accordingly, the inflation target is treated as a 
focal policy goal while the exchange rate stability is regarded as a policy indicator variable. The 
policy-makers considering relative inflation-forecast targeting may wish to develop a system of 
continuous monitoring and active responding to the differentials between the domestic and the 
foreign inflation-forecasts for a predetermined time-period. They may use a range of indicator 
variables that have a predictive power for inflation, including various measures of exchange rate 
stability. 
   The main prerequisite for adopting RIFT is a prior record of monetary stability, which 
will enable policy-makers to devise a reliable instrument rule guiding the inflationary process.  
At minimum, a stable functional relationship between the inflation forecast, exchange rate and 
market interest rates ought to in place so that the transmission of changes in interest rates and the 
exchange rate into anticipated inflation should be known to policy-makers.   
The empirical analysis shows that the determination of a stable instrument rule for RIFT 
is entirely possible and may serve well the euro-convergence policies of the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary.  The conducted GARCH-M-GED tests show pronounced, yet diverse 
interactions between short-term market interest rates, the inflation differentials and the exchange 
rates. They also prove some sensitivity of domestic interest rates to the German rates. However, 
the significance coefficients of these variables are not uniform.  The diverse interactions between 
the key monetary variables highlight systemic and institutional differences underlying the euro-
convergence process. Therefore, specific rules and means of pursuing the proposed RIFT based 
policy require careful tailoring to the existing institutional and behavioral conditions of a given 
country.  
 It shall be further noted that an effective implementation of RIFT is unlikely to be 
hindered the policy constraints engendered by the ERM2, providing the reference exchange rate 
for the ERM2 entry is determined correctly.  A properly determined entry rate should be fully 
aligned with the forecast of the long-run market equilibrium exchange rate that is credible for 
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financial markets. A suboptimal entry rate implies a narrower de facto than the de jure band of 
permitted currency fluctuations. It may exacerbate exchange rate volatility in response to market 
expectations of the reference rate resetting. It may further incite more frequent, costly and 
asymmetric foreign exchange market interventions. In essence, the precepts of RIFT are 
consistent with the Maastricht convergence criteria providing that the exhange rate band will be 
maintained at a wide +/- 15 percent range around the central parity rate.  The wide band is likely 
to yield a sufficient degree of exchange rate flexibility that will enable the converging countries 
to implement inflation targeting strategies based on RIFT.  
It seems that the intended euro adoption by the examined NMS is still distant enough to 
allow for modifications of their existing inflation-targeting regimes that take into account the 
euro-convergence parameters.  Specific guidelines and prescriptions for RIFT need further 
discussion and articulation in order to make policies to this end entirely possible.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of NMS and eurozone inflation series 
 
 DIT 
adoption 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Time 
trend 
ADF 
stat. 
 
Czech R. 
 
 
Jan.1998 
 
3.33 
 
2.80 
 
3.00 
 
+1.90 
 
6.67 
 
-0.052 
 
-2.72 
(-2.88) 
 
Poland 
 
 
Jan. 1999 
 
4.02 
 
3.30 
 
3.14 
 
+0.81 
 
2.47 
 
-0.081 
 
-1.60 
(-2.89) 
 
Hungary 
 
 
June2001 
 
5.48 
 
4.90 
 
1.96 
 
+0.38 
 
2.34 
 
-0.018 
 
-2.64 
(-2.90) 
 
Eurozone 
 
 
Jan.1999 
(euro 
inception) 
 
2.04 
 
2.10 
 
0.43 
 
-0.88 
 
4.05 
 
+0.005 
 
-3.33 
(-2.89) 
 
Notes: monthly series of CPI-based year-on-year inflation for NMS since DIT adoption and 
HICP-based inflation for eurozone since euro inception, all through June 2007. Time trend = 
average monthly linear time trend coefficient. ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
(with McKinnon critical values at 5 percent in parentheses).  
 
Data Source: Czech Statistical Office, Polish Statistical Office, NBH and Bundesbank. 
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Table 2: Volatility dynamics of RIFT instrument function.   
   GARCH(p,q)-M-GED tests, Eqs. (12) and (13), for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. January 1995 – June 2007 sample period.  
  
Dependent variable: change in the domestic short-term interest rate. 
 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Applied lag operators for: 
 
∆  inflation differential (τ ) 
∆ log spot exchange rate (n) 
∆ German short-term interest r.(k)  
 
 
+1 
0 
+1 
 
 
+1 
0 
+1 
 
 
+1 
+1 
+1 
Conditional mean equation  
 
constant ( 0β ) 
∆ infl. differential ( piβ ) 
∆ log spot exchange rate ( sβ ) 
∆ German s.t. interest rate ( fβ ) 
GARCH cond. variance ( ψβ )  
 
 
0.012 (1.46) 
-0.002 (-0.029) 
1.900 (2.58)*** 
0.233 (3.71)*** 
-0.395 (-3.15)*** 
 
 
0.730 (5.10)*** 
0.203 (13.25)*** 
3.121 (4.17)*** 
0.128 (1.72)* 
1.087 (3.92)*** 
 
 
-0.072 (-3.67)*** 
0.172 (5.51)*** 
-4.143 (-4.55)*** 
0.543 (2.77)*** 
-0.027 (-0.50) 
 
Conditional variance eq. 
 
Constant 
ARCH 1st order 
ARCH 2nd order 
ARCH 3rd order 
 
GARCH 1st order 
 
 
 
0.002 (1.45) 
0.541 (3.22)*** 
-0.500 (-3.22)*** 
0.116 (3.04)*** 
 
0.820 (12.83)*** 
 
 
0.185 (3.56)*** 
-0.011 (-1.50) 
0.059 (4.61)*** 
-0.029 (-3.55)*** 
 
0.606 (58.63)*** 
 
 
-0.001 (-0.71) 
0.561 (1.83)** 
-0.489 (-1.64)* 
na 
 
0.935 (18.35)*** 
GED parameter 0.810 (7.11)*** 0.588 (7.03)*** 0.808 (6.78)*** 
Diagnostic statistics 
 
log likelihood 
AIC 
SIC 
 
 
1.573 
0.127 
0.350 
 
 
-107.48 
1.601 
1.824 
 
 
-108.79 
1.605 
1.807 
GARCH forecast accuracy 
 
Theil U-coefficient 
Bias proportion 
Variance proportion 
Covariance proportion 
 
 
0.223 
0.042 
0.808 
0.150 
 
 
0.286 
0.853 
0.131 
0.015 
 
 
0.072 
0.026 
0.185 
0.788 
 
Notes: z-statistics are in parentheses; AIC and SIC are Akaike and Schwartz information criteria; nominal exchange 
rates are average monthly national currency values of the euro, and prior to 1999, of the German mark adjusted by 
its irrevocable conversion rate to the euro of 1.95583; differentials are monthly year-on-year national vis-à-vis 
eurozone headline CPI inflation rates; log of GARCH conditional variance applied for Hungary and GARCH cond. 
variance for Czech R. and Poland; *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
Source: Own computation based on the IMF, Bundesbank, CNB, NBH and NBP data. 
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Figure 1a: Impulse responses between inflation differentials vis-à-vis eurozone, exchange rate and 
short-term interest rate in the Czech Republic 
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Data source: as in Table 2. 
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Figure 1b: Impulse responses between inflation differentials vis-à-vis eurozone, exchange rate 
and short-term interest rate in Poland  
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Data source: as in Table 2. 
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Figure 1c: Impulse responses between inflation differentials vis-à-vis eurozone, exchange rate 
and short-term interest rate in Hungary. 
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Data source: as in Table 2. 
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Figure 2a:  GARCH conditional variance dynamics for the Czech Republic  
                   (generated from the functional relationship specified in Table 2). 
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Figure 2b: GARCH conditional variance dynamics for Poland  
                   (generated from the functional relationship specified in Table 2). 
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Figure 2c: GARCH conditional variance dynamics for Hungary 
                   (generated from the functional relationship specified in Table 2). 
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